Paul Magriel vs. Berj Abadjian
The Plimpton Cup Championship
Bill Robertie, 1982
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From Backgammon Times, Volume 2, Number 4, Fall 1982.
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The Open Section of this year's Plimpton Cup featured, as usual, one of the strongest fields assembled anywhere in the world. Paul Magriel, Chuck Papazian, Billy Horan, Nack Ballard, Berj Abadjian, Sandy Lubetkin, Kent Goulding, Kit Woolsey, Mike Maxakuli, Mike Senkiewicz, David Leibowitz, Hugh Sconyers, Dick Furlaud, Arthur Dickman, Gaby Horowitz—a veritable all-star team of the Western Hemisphere.
By the tourney's end, Nack Ballard was the sole survivor, pocketing the $31,500 first prize. He persevered through an incredible eight-hour semifinal match with Abadjian (final score, 19–18 Ballard, at 6 a.m. Sunday morning), then a tough, seesaw 21–19 final with Sandy Lubetkin.
This issue's game is the first of the 5th-round match between Paul Magriel and Berj Abadjian. Paul Magriel should, I think, need no introduction to Backgammon Times's readers. Suffice to say he has the best lifetime tournament record of anyone in the world and is the author of the standard text on the game as well as the only player known to the public at large.
A Rumanian now living in New York City, Berj Abadjian is well respected in the inner circles of backgammon. His tournament play has been generally limited to Las Vegas and Monte Carlo, although he has been quite successful in his few appearances. In the Plimpton Cup, for example, he reached the round of 8 in the Amateur tourney and the semifinals of the Open event.
Abadjian perhaps possesses the most complex and baroque style of play in the world. A great believer in the power of outside primes, he is at the same time one of the few remaining players who will use a backgammon as an offensive weapon. An Abadjian match is always interesting for spectators, provided they have the stamina to stay to the end. (Four, five, and even eight-hour matches are part of his style.)
* * *
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Magriel (Black) |
Abadjian (White) |
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| 1. |
3-2: 24/21, 13/11 |
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I recently completed a survey of the opening move and the replies to the opening move in a sample of 1500 master games. For an opening 3-2, the conventional play of two men down, 13/10, 13/11, was favored by about 8-to-1 over this split play. Dennis Waterman and Nack Ballard have been the main proponents of splitting, although Magriel has joined their ranks in recent months.
The two plays have quite different strategic objectives. Pulling two men down puts extra pressure on the 5, 4, and bar points, thus restraining the second player from splitting on his turn. With both sides declining to leave the 24-points, a battle of mutual prime formations is the most likely result.
The split play, on the other hand, encourages the second player to attack the blot on the 4-point if at all possible. If a hitting contest centers on the 4-point, a game of mutual advanced anchors develops. Although such games may involve several men back on each side, they are typically less dynamic than the priming positions resulting from playing two men down.
| 1. |
. . . |
6-4: 24/14* |
| 2. |
2-1: bar/24, 13/11* |
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White to play 4-3.
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| 2. |
. . . |
4-3: bar/21, 24/21 |
A reliable rule for the opening: make constructive plays whenever possible. Building an anchor is stronger than the loose hit (bar/22, 8/4*) which still leaves White without a new point anywhere on the board.
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Black to play 5-3.
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A beginner, well-schooled in the concepts of duplication and outer-board control, might give some thought to 24/16. That move duplicates 4s, keeps an extra builder on the midpoint, and puts pressure on both outer boards. Nonetheless, a more experienced player would probably not even consider the move. The problems with stringing blots around the board in the opening are twofold:
- The danger of an immediate knockout.
- The problem of subsequently cleaning up all the blots if the opponent makes a constructive, nonhitting play.
A move like 24/16 can lead to several turns of scrambling to consolidate while the opponent maintains an initiative. Magriel correctly equalizes the game with a simple, strong play.
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White to play 4-2.
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| 3. |
. . . |
4-2: 13/9, 13/11 |
A strangely awkward number. Abadjian's play, relieving the stack on the midpoint, looks best. The alternative is 13/7.
| 4. |
6-5: 21/16*/10 |
6-2: bar/23, 21/15* |
| 5. |
4-2: bar/21, 6/4* |
4-2: bar/21*, 23/21 |
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Black to play 3-2.
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The last several moves on both sides have been forced, but now Magriel has a real choice. Hitting might look like the obvious play, but the early abandonment of the midpoint represents a real strategic risk, especially with 4 men back. I would dismiss making the 22-point (bar/22, 24/22) as too committal. My own preference is bar/23, 8/5, which duplicates ones and preserves all points.
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White to play 5-4.
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A diversionary play. Being hit on the 16-point will not bother White in the slightest, while pressure on the three outer-board blots will prevent Black from making a more useful point.
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Black to play 3-1.
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Magriel would dearly like to make either 5-point, but Abadjian's last play has made that goal a bit too costly.
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White to play 4-3.
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| 7. |
. . . |
4-3: 6/2*, 21/18 |
An atrocious roll. Abadjian's move looks bizarre, but makes sense upon examination. The tempo hit with 6/2* prevents Magriel from making a point next turn. The other possible 3s, 11/8 or 16/13, reduce Abadjian's flexibility, so he elects instead to play 21/18. Although Abadjian's position looks loose, Magriel will need to roll 1-1 or 2-2 to land a punch.
| 8. |
6-4: bar/21, 10/4* |
4-1: bar/21*, 2/1* |
| 9. |
6-5: bar/20 |
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White to play 4-2.
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Trying to make the 5-point with 11/5* is also quite reasonable. As I mentioned in the introductory remarks, however, Abadjian places great faith in the power of outside primes, and this play is characteristic of his style.
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Black to play 3-2.
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An excellent play. Making another anchor with bar/20 is weak, since the 5-4 game is ineffective when the opponent can simply drop checkers behind it. Had Magriel made that play, Abadjian would have a strong double as soon as he disengaged his straggler. Magriel correctly steers for contact and the opportunity to go forward.
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White to play 4-3.
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| 10. |
. . . |
4-3: bar/21*/18 |
Bar/21*, 8/5* is also plausible, but Abadjian has no objection to Magriel's entering on the high points in his board. Instead, he preserves his builder on the 8-point to make the bar later.
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Black to play 3-2.
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By building the 22-point, rather than the 20-point, Magriel makes Abadjian's task of coming home more onerous.
| 11. |
. . . |
6-1: 13/7*, 8/7 |
| 12. |
6-1: bar/24*, 21/15 |
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White to roll.
Double?
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Typically Abadjian! Although most players would not consider turning the cube here, Abadjian offers an aggressive double, based, I suspect as much on confidence in his ability in complex positions as on the latent strength of his outside prime.
White's threat is to hit the blot on the 10-point, then close that point if Magriel fails to enter and hit. If Abadjian constructs a 5-prime from the 6-point to the 10-point (or from the 5-point to the 9-point), with 5 or 6 men trapped behind it, Magriel would have to pass a double. In too many variations, Black's home board would collapse before he could free enough men to preserve his timing.
In the actual position, the 5-prime is only a latent threat, which makes Abadjian's double somewhat suspect. I played this position out 100 times, with these results:
| White (Abadjian) won a gammon: |
14% |
| White won: |
44% |
| Black (Magriel) won: |
42% |
Magriel's approximate equity after accepting is −60 points/100 games, or −0.6 points/game. Quite an easy take, of course.
An after-doubling equity of 0.6 points may or may not indicate a double, depending on the volatility of the position. This position is relatively static: White's only potential market losers are 3-3 and 1-1, not enough to justify turning the cube. His optimal strategy is to refrain from doubling, turning the cube next move only if he can hit on the 10-point and Black misses the return hit.
| 13. |
Take |
4-4: bar/21, 18/10*, 18/14 |
| 14. |
4-2: bar/23, 8/4* |
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White to play 5-1.
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| 14. |
. . . |
5-1: bar/24, 13/8 |
This move seems inconsistent with Abadjian's previous strategy. I would have played 16/11 with the 5, preserving three builders for the 10 point.
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Black to play 6-1.
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The double hit is mandatory as both sides struggle for Abadjian's 10-point.
A vital miss; Magriel may now have time to make both his 4-point and his 15-point, effectively equalizing the game.
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Black to play 2-1.
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Better than the ultra-conservative 10/9. The blots on the 9 and 10-points are exposed to only 5 numbers, while the 21-point will serve as Magriel's permanent link to the outside world.
| 16. |
. . . |
2-1: bar/23, 14/13 |
Another awkward throw. If Magriel can hit the blot in the outfield or make his 5-point, he will have the upper hand.
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Black to play 6-4.
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Very pure, but I think a bit too loose, given the critical nature of the position. This play leaves Abadjian with 28 quite useful hitting numbers (all 2s and 3s, plus 6-6, 5-5, 4-4, 1-1, 6-1, and 5-4). Abadjian can make Magriel's bar with 6-5. The only relatively bad rolls are 6-4, 5-1, and 4-1, and these allow Abadjian to hit loose in his inner board, preserving the initiative.
Some other reasonable plays:
- 15/9, 24/20, making the 9-point at the cost of some outfield control.
- 24/20, 8/2*, a tempo play, maintaining the status quo at the cost of a possibly wasted checker.
- 21/15, 10/6, riskiest of all, which leaves Magriel in very good shape if he doesn't get blitzed.
My preference is 15/9, 24/20.
| 17. |
. . . |
5-5: 8/3*(2), 7/2*(2) |
The axe falls. Abadjian properly abandons his prime for a very good shot at an immediate gammon.
| 18. |
5-1: bar/20, bar/24 |
5-5: 6/1*(2), 23/13 |
| 19. |
6-5: bar/20, 15/9 |
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Incredible. Magriel not only survives the blitz but is now the favorite! He has vastly superior timing and can win either by priming Abadjian's back checkers or playing a very strong 5-4 holding game.
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White to play 5-1.
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| 19. |
. . . |
5-1: 13/8, 24/23 |
Best. Abadjian can't afford to bury any more checkers.
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Black to play 6-5.
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An absorbing position with an extraordinarily difficult choice to be made. Besides Magriel's play, breaking the anchor to make the 10-point (which I'll call Play A), Black could reasonably consider any of the following:
- Play B: 14/8, 9/4, completely safe.
- Play C: 9/3, 8/3, making the 3-point.
- Play D: 14/8, 10/5, slotting the 5-point.
- Play E: 20/14, 20/15, remaking a midpoint.
These plays all entail various degrees of immediate risk. Here is a tabulation of the danger on the next turn:
- Play A: 33 shots, 2 blots.
- Play B: 0 shots, 0 blots.
- Play C: 21 shots, 3 blots.
- Play D: 23 shots, 1 blot.
- Play E: 15 shots, 2 blots.
What makes this position so difficult to resolve is the number of competing strategic ideas. Black's decision has to take into account the following considerations:
- Black doesn't want to be hit this turn. If hit, Black may not be able to contain White's back checkers.
- Black wants to keep good distribution, to extend his growing prime as quickly as possible.
- If forced into a 5-4 backgame, Black will have nearly perfect timing. He is a favorite to get at least one double shot as White dismantles the 9, 8, and 6-points. If he misses, though, he will likely be gammoned.
I showed this position to a number of top players, to see if any unanimity of opinion existed as to the best play. Although opinions varied wildly, most rated Plays C and E on top, with a slight majority preferring Play C. Plays A and B were rated the worst, with the safe Play B ranking at the bottom.
The only reliable way to attack a position this complex is through simulation. Here are the results of 100 trials with each possibility:
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A |
B |
C |
D |
E |
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| White won gammon: |
26 |
17 |
15 |
18 |
12 |
| White won: |
26 |
22 |
15 |
25 |
24 |
| Black won: |
48 |
61 |
70 |
57 |
64 |
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| Points/game: |
−0.60 |
+0.10 |
+0.50 |
−0.08 |
+0.32 |
These figures produce approximate equities for each play computed from Black's point of view and shown in the "Points/game" row. (To compute one of these equities, for example, that of Play A, simply notice that in 100 games, Black lost 26 gammons (26 × −4) and 26 games at the 2 level (26 × −2) and won 48 games at the 2 level (48 × +2), for a net of −104 − 52 + 96 = −60 in 100 games, or −0.60 per game.)
Some conclusions:
Play A is the weakest since it discards the second plan entirely. By breaking one of his anchors, Black forces White to attack when White's relative inclination to attack (measured by number of inner board points) is greatest. If Black survives the attack he should win, but he runs a greatly increased risk of being gammoned.
The great strength of Play C is that Black moves forward in the most direct manner, making an additional inner point and leaving his remaining checkers well distributed. If White doesn't hit this turn, he is under tremendous pressure. Even if he does hit, Black's chances in the 5-4 game are quite good.
Plays B, D, and E are moderately effective. Play B is not really safe, since Black will often have to leave shots next turn to make progress. Play D looks thematic, but Black doesn't make the 5-point all that often; the probability that White misses and Black then covers is only 25%. Play E renounces the 5-4 game, but keeps good distribution and is relatively safe.
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White to play 2-2.
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A great roll (his best, in fact), but how to play it? I like 6/4*(2), 13/11*, 9/7, hitting two checkers. The 5-point board looks impressive, but if Magriel now throws a 5, the pendulum swings the other way. Hitting two checkers should guarantee a little extra time.
| 21. |
—o— |
3-1: 24/20 |
| 22. |
—o— |
5-1: 23/18, 13/12 |
| 23. |
5-1: bar/20, 14/13* |
6-5: bar/20, 18/12* |
| 24. |
—o— |
6-1: 20/13 |
| 25. |
—o— |
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White to play 4-4.
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| 25. |
. . . |
4-4: 12/8, 13/9, 6/2(2) |
Magriel's outside prime does its job as Abadjian suddenly runs out of 4s.
| 26. |
—o— |
6-4: 20/14, 8/4 |
| 27. |
—o— |
5-2: 9/4, 14/12 |
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Black to play 5-1.
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Magriel enters, but a bit late. Abadjian should leave one direct shot bearing in, and Magriel is a favorite to be gammoned if he misses it.
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Black to play 6-3.
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Alert. Playing 10/7 greatly increases Magriel's chances if he hits the upcoming shot, and shouldn't affect his race to save the gammon very much.
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Black to play 6-1.
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Again, Magriel maximizes his winning chances and spurns a crossover with 7/6. Abadjian still has all of 7 numbers that leave a shot (3-1, 2-1, 4-4, 2-2, and 1-1).
The end. Magriel now needs 18 crossovers in (probably) 7 turns to save the gammon, requiring at least two sets of doubles.
| 32. |
4-3: 10/6, 9/6 |
4-1: 4/off, 1/off |
| 33. |
3-3: 9/6, 15/12, 14/11, 13/10 |
5-3: 4/off, 3/off |
| 34. |
6-2: 12/6, 8/6 |
5-5: 4/off, 3/off(2), 2/off |
| 35. |
6-6: 20/8, 11/5, 10/4 |
5-2: 2/off(2) |
| 36. |
4-2: |
Win gammon |
One roll short.
On the whole, an extraordinarily fine game. Both players displayed a depth of originality and understanding characteristic of modern backgammon at its best. Magriel eventually crept back to tie the match at 7–7, but Abadjian in a final spurt won 17–9 and moved to the quarterfinals.
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